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Pursuing Pankalia: The Theodicy of St. Augustine 
A.G. Holdier 
In a field filled with out of control trolley cars, brains-in-vats, and at least one color-blind 
neuroscientist, philosophers often find ourselves returning to the same illustrations to express our 
ideas; in the library of such thought experiments, somewhere between one of Theseus‘ ships and 
a room holding a Chinese writer, lies a dog-eared copy of Dostoevsky‘s The Brothers 
Karamazov with a long line of theodicists waiting for their turn to read it. Amidst the classic 
story of a struggling Russian family, one conversation between Alyosha and his brother Ivan has 
stood out as a famous study of what academics have dubbed ―The Problem of Evil.‖  
If God truly exists, Alyosha‘s brother demands, then why does He not prevent the 
tragedies that fill our world?  After cataloging a series of such profane abuses, primarily of 
children, Ivan laughs at the suggestion that such evils could all be ultimately used for some 
―greater good,‖ somehow woven together into an ultimately beautiful tapestry, and proclaims 
that even if some Deity exists, that method of operation should disqualify such a god from being 
worthy of any worship. ―I don‘t want harmony,‖ Ivan cries, ―From love for humanity I don‘t 
want it…Besides, too high a price is asked for harmony; it‘s beyond our means to pay so much 
to enter on it.‖1 Instead, Ivan tells a story of a bitter humanist who has secretly rejected God for 
the sake of caring for God‘s people; by painting himself the color of his own Grand Inquisitor, 
Ivan seeks to embody his commitment to holding God accountable for the many who are 
damned. 
Ivan is disgusted by evil, by God, and by the ugliness of life; a faithful reply to him, then, 
must respond to three separate points: something metaphysical (1), something theological (2), 
and finally something aesthetic (3); it is precisely at the intersection of these three fields where 
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the theodicy of St. Augustine of Hippo can be found. Writing roughly fifteen centuries before 
Dostoevsky, Augustine shared many of the concerns of Ivan Karamazov, but his thoughtful 
contextualization of evil into a properly Christian worldview gave the neo-Platonic philosopher 
far more powerful resources for reconciling God and the reality of evil. Augustine offers (1) a 
metaphysical definition of evil that allows for (2) a theological conception of damning free will 
that is fashioned by God into (3) pankalia, or ―universal beauty.‖ By seeing evil as a void rather 
than a substance, Augustine is able to recognize evil actions as freely chosen sins of human 
agents – sins that, though evil, still function aesthetically to display the harmony of God‘s 
creation.  
To answer Ivan, each of these three Augustinian points shall be considered in turn: the 
definition of evil as a privation, the damnable power of free agents, and finally, the ultimate 
design for the pankalia of God‘s Creation as centering on poetic justice. Though Augustine‘s 
position may not be fully satisfactory, it lays a strong foundation for further study. 
(1) Something Metaphysical: Privation 
The most foundational element of Augustine‘s answer to Ivan‘s Problem lies in his 
definition of evil as the privatio boni or ―the removal of good‖ and not as a proper substance in 
its own right.
2
 Even at first glance the power of such a definition is clear, for one need not defend 
a God for creating evil if evil is not a thing that can be created. Instead, Augustinian evil is 
similar to physical phenomena like coldness or darkness, except that rather than ‗existing‘ as the 
absence or diminishment of either heat or light, evil is simply the absence of goodness – that is, 
the absence of God. 
As the young Augustine came to reject the bitheistic Manicheanism of his youth, with its 
purely good deity existing eternally opposite a purely evil one, his philosophical answer to Ivan 
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Karamazov‘s question began to take shape. The Manichean model had required Augustine to 
admit the eternality of evil, something his newfound Christianity was loathe to affirm. 
Eventually, under the tutelage of St. Ambrose of Milan,
3
 Augustine came to recognize God as 
the sole supranatural ontological grounding in which all other beings find their foundation: 
[I]t is the one true God who is active and operative in all those things [the entirety 
of Creation], but always acting as God, that is, present everywhere in his totality, 
free from all spatial confinement, completely untrammeled, absolutely indivisible, 
utterly unchangeable, and filling heaven and earth with his ubiquitous power 
which is independent of anything in the natural order.
4
 
Consequently, with God as the metaphysical standard for existence in the universe, Augustine 
easily adopted into his worldview the Neoplatonic Great Chain of Being that fashioned the entire 
cosmos into a hierarchical structure;
5
 Augustine simply placed the Christian God at the top of the 
ladder of existence, recognizing that ―He is before all things and in Him all things hold 
together.‖6 
On this view, however, existence of any form constitutes at least some form of 
participation in the good reality of the Divine Being who defines the nature of perfect existence;
7
 
because of this, Augustine needed Plotinus‘ definition of evil in the Enneads8 to truly make 
headway with his theology. By defining evil simply as ―non-being,‖ Augustine was able to make 
sense of how the Chain of Being that emanates from a perfect God could be comprised of less-
than-perfect creatures while simultaneously denying a spot on that chain for ramified ―Evil‖ 
itself; as he says ―[t]here is no such entity in nature as ‗evil‘; ‗evil‘ is merely the name for the 
privation of good. There is a scale of value stretching from earthly to heavenly realities, from the 
visible to the invisible; and the inequality between these goods makes possible the existence of 
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them all.‖9 If everything that exists was perfectly good, then ―everything‖ would be identical to 
the perfect God; the gradation of existence is actually made possible by privation. 
However, because all existence is ultimately of and from a good God, existence qua 
existence must be good – a fact compounded by recognizing God as an intentional, good Creator. 
But if Augustine is correct that God designs creatures to be what He intends them to be, then it is 
only by corruption that something becomes anything less.
10
 In the words of Phillip Tallon, the 
practice of evil is ―to become less than what one was created to be; to become, not the good thing 
that God made, but something else, a perverted thing of our own doing.‖11 Entities are called 
evil, then, when they either come to lack a property that they should possess or, conversely, they 
gain a property God did not intend them to have. 
This analysis of privation applies not only to intrinsic properties that reside solely within 
the beings themselves, but to the relational properties of those beings to their surroundings as 
well. When those relational properties are properly ordered per God‘s design, then it is good; 
when the relationship is inappropriate, even if it is internally consistent, that disruption of 
propriety is what Rowan Williams has dubbed a ―grammar‖ of evil, as Tallon summarizes how: 
….there may be a disjunctive quality between subject, verb, and object. The 
phrases ―Philip worshipped God‖ and ―Philip played tennis‖ both consist of only 
positive terms. Yet these phrases, consisting of exactly the same terms, ―Philip 
played God‖ and ―Philip worshipped tennis,‖ indicate a state of affairs that, 
because they are disordered, are evil and therefore degrade the subject, verb, and 
object through their disjuncture.
12
 
Again, even without intrinsic change, Philip‘s shift in relational properties is equally dubbed 
―evil‖. 
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By way of example, consider a compassionless brute attacking a helpless victim: because 
the attacker exists, he must lie somewhere on the Great Chain of Being, but his lack of 
compassion (a property that, as a human being, he should possess) means that he is lacking an 
intrinsic property that would make him more good or more God-like – this lack of goodness is 
evil. However, this brute is also choosing to attack an innocent person, an event that should not 
take place, so he is also disrupting the proper ordering of the universe; this lack of order is also 
evil.
13
  
However, because some level of variation in goodness is necessary for the variety in 
Creation to exist and because God is ―the best Maker of all natures, the One Who oversees them 
with the greatest justice,‖14 then Augustine is confident that a good God will successfully weave 
both intrinsic and relation evils together into something ultimately worthwhile. This shall be 
addressed further in Section (3). 
In the meantime, Augustine‘s definition of evil as the privatio boni effectively eliminates 
much of the apparent evil in the world under the guise of a preeminent God‘s just and loving care 
of the Creation He fashions as good, the inner workings of which are not always clear to its 
inhabitants: 
Divine providence thus warns us not to indulge in silly complaints about the state 
of affairs, but to take pains to inquire what useful purposes are served by things. 
And when we fail to find the answer…we should believe that the purpose is 
hidden from us… There is a useful purpose in the obscurity of the purpose; it may 
serve to exercise our humility or to undermine our pride.
15
 
For those examples of evil that are identifiable as such, however, Augustine is still loathe to 
attribute them to a perfect God – it is to finite creatures that the blame for evil must fall. 
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(2) Something Theological: The Power of Freedom 
In what has been called ―the most famous and central aspect‖ of his theodicy,16 
Augustine deploys legal language of guilt and blame to recognize the depravity of evil while 
attempting to absolve the Creator God of responsibility for the chosen evil actions of free agents. 
Although Augustine‘s overall conception of freedom takes some unpacking, it never completely 
diverges, not even in his developed thoughts later in life, from the sentiment expressed early on 
in his Christian writings that ―evils have their being by the voluntary sin of the soul, to which 
God gave free will.‖17 
To equate evil with sin, a chosen action contrary to the perfect will of God, allows 
Augustine to shift much of the Problem of Evil squarely onto the backs of free moral agents and 
away from the shoulders of the perfect Divine. Following from the understanding of evil as the 
privatio boni, evil as sin is any chosen action that fails to meet God‘s expected standards of 
behavior and therefore lacks the goodness that it should possess. If agents truly are free to choose 
either right or wrong actions (in the way that we naturally assume them to be blameworthy), then 
it is not only the case that evil becomes a logically necessary possibility under genuine free will, 
but it is also true that God is not to blame when a genuinely free agent abuses their free will and 
sinfully actualizes something evil. By definition, a free evil act becomes a sin, an act that God 
would not will and does not, Himself, choose – to blame God for an action He neither wills nor 
controls is hardly appropriate. 
This libertarian understanding of free will does assume that an action must be voluntary 
and intentional in order to be blameworthy: a woman who sneezes and drops a kitchen knife out 
her window might be faulted for carelessness, but even if that knife happens to fall on and kill a 
passerby on the street below, the woman could not be properly blamed as a murderer – she 
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neither chose to kill nor intended it to happen.
18
 But if blameworthiness for moral evil is based in 
intention, so too is praiseworthiness for moral goodness, therefore the necessity of a genuine 
choice between right and wrong – what Plantinga has come to call a morally significant choice – 
becomes central to a free-will theodicy. As Plantinga, a foremost contemporary free will 
defender, puts it: 
…God can create free creatures, but He can‘t cause or determine them to do only 
what is right. For if He does so, then they aren‘t significantly free after all; they 
do not do what is right freely. To create creatures capable of moral good, 
therefore, He must create creatures capable of moral evil…The fact that free 
creatures sometimes go wrong, however, counts neither against God‘s 
omnipotence nor against His goodness; for He could have forestalled the 
occurrence of moral evil only by removing the possibility of moral good.
19
 
Much like how if God desires to create a two-dimensional, three-sided geometric figure, then He 
is bound by logic to make a triangle, God is in a similar bind if He desires to create potentially 
good free agents: to get the possibility of good, He must simultaneously create the possibility of 
evil. 
This is precisely Augustine‘s position. He begins Book Three of On the Free Choice of 
the Will by having Evodius agree that ―no blame can be attached where nature and necessity 
predominate‖20 before contrasting human actions with a falling stone to point out that ―the 
movement of the stone is natural, but the movement of the mind is voluntary‖ and while we 
would not charge the stone with a sin, ―we charge the mind with sin when we find it guilty of 
abandoning higher goods to put lower goods first for its enjoyment.‖21 To put this description of 
evil into terms already used in this chapter: we charge the mind with sin when it willfully tries to 
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replace God at the pinnacle of the Great Chain of Being and pursues something of lesser 
importance. This reordering of one‘s desires is a disruption of one‘s intrinsic properties (and is 
therefore evil); by acting on those corrupted desires, the agent chooses a course of action that 
differs from God‘s perfect will, thereby disrupting the relation properties of the agent (which is 
also evil), as well as damaging both intrinsic and relational properties of other objects in the 
universe. As Augustine reiterates elsewhere, because evil is only the privatio boni, ―There is no 
evil in the universe, but in individuals there is evil due to their own fault.‖22 
One might fairly ask, though, why God would care to create free agents at all, if freedom 
truly is such a dangerous tool to be wielded – would it not be better for God to create morally 
neutral automata if it meant that no evil would result? To this, Augustine replies that freedom 
allows for greater goods to exist than if freedom were absent. However, he firstly chastises 
anyone who would imagine their own creative ability to surpass God‘s perfect skill and argues 
that it is petulant to complain that lesser things exist (sinful agents) when greater things can be 
imagined (nonsinful agents).
23
 Simply because greater things can exist on the Chain of Being 
does not mean that God is to be blamed for allowing gradation along that chain; as Augustine 
says, ―it is like someone who, grasping perfect roundness in his mind, become upset that he does 
not find it in a nut, never having seen any round object except fruits of this sort.‖24 God allows 
freedom because a being who freely displays love and devotion to God is greater than one who 
does so mindlessly or unfreely;
25
 criticizing freedom itself on the basis of its abuse at the hands 
of free agents is, again, quite missing Augustine‘s point. 
To be fair, not all philosophers affirm libertarian free well and compatibilists would have 
no problem with a free agent being unable to act otherwise than she does in a given scenario. 
Particularly in the case of Augustine, it would be a significant oversight to ignore compatibilist 
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notions of freedom for the sake of focusing entirely on the above libertarian presentation. Later 
in life, Augustine‘s apologetics for the doctrine of original sin colored his definition of freedom 
sufficiently such that many readers now identify a shift in his thinking from his earlier writings 
to his later ones.
26
 If Augustine did come to embrace a different definition of freedom that would 
allow for God to fully determine an agent‘s free choices, then everything in his theodicy as it has 
been presented thus far would crumble – a consequence that Augustine himself never seemed to 
admit. Although space does not permit a full response to the charge of Augustinian inconsistency 
on a definition of freedom, two points should be briefly considered by way of rebuttal. 
Firstly, the shift in Augustine‘s writings in relation to the Pelagian controversy later in his 
life likely had more to do with his rhetoric than his logic. Whereas his earlier comments on 
freedom that sound particularly libertarian were responding to an unorthodox group concerned 
with God‘s goodness (Manicheans), Augustine emphasized at that point the elements of his 
theology that were ignored by his then-opponents: God‘s singular blamelessness and humanity‘s 
graceful ability to choose rightly or wrongly. Later in his life, recognizing the extent to which his 
comments had been twisted by new, previously unforeseen enemies (Pelagians), Augustine 
attempted to adjust the swing of the heterodox pendulum by emphasizing different elements of 
his thought: the sinfulness of humanity and our need of God‘s assistance for ultimate success.27 
This would not necessarily require that he reject libertarianism for compatibilism, but given the 
disparate contexts of his comments, it should not be surprising that different themes rise to the 
surface at different times, particularly when it can be shown that all of these themes are present 
throughout the Augustinian corpus. 
That is the second point: the theme of human depravity and our need for God to empower 
our free choices is something that appears in Augustine earliest writings, not simply those 
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written after his alleged position-shift. Those who would claim that Augustine moves from a 
libertarian understanding of free will to affirm a compatibilistic framework tend to do so because 
of his later increased emphasis on the sovereignty of God and the necessity of His grace for 
human agency to function; this sounds quite similar to Augustine‘s call in his early On the Free 
Choice of the Will that ―our freedom is this: to submit to this truth, which is our God Who set us 
free from death – that is, from the state of sin.‖28 When ―the Early‖ Augustine references a verse 
like Psalm 37:4 (―Delight yourself in the LORD; And He will give you the desires of your 
heart‖),29 he is making the point that a human agent must choose to bow the knee to the God who 
satisfies all desires, but it is only by God‘s grace that those desires are at all satisfied.30 On this 
reading, Augustine is championing a God granting grace to humans, while also recognizing that 
the onus is on the human to receive the gift, or, as King puts it, ―what is shared from a 
metaphysical point of view might yet be chalked up to individual responsibility from a moral 
point of view.‖31 And, in the other direction, libertarian free choices and some of the 
philosophical grounding difficulties that such open options create, appear even in Augustine‘s 
later works, for example predominating his discussion of the efficient cause of evil in Book 
Twelve of The City of God.
32
  
However, regardless of whether Augustine can easily be identified as affirming either 
libertarian or compatibilistic free will, both recognize God‘s grace shown to somehow-free 
agents, thereby giving them the opportunity to be great by loving God, even though they have the 
ability to sin. This serves Augustine‘s model primarily by underlining the penal character of evil, 
whether or not moral blameworthiness is compatible with determinism. This is simply to say that 
although both the libertarian and the compatibilist will understand the metaphysical situation 
differently, their moral assessment of a sinful agent‘s depraved condition will ultimately agree, 
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meaning that one more facet of evil on Augustine‘s view should be recognized: its function as a 
tool for righteous punishment of sin. 
The possible retributive function of evil follows a line of thinking exemplified well by 
Augustine‘s recognition of a certain element of beauty in death; in Book Thirteen of The City of 
God, Augustine explains why sin leads to death for all people, even those who are forgiven of 
their sins and justified in God‘s sight: in light of Christ‘s victory over death, ―it is not that death 
has turned into a good thing…[but]…that God has granted to faith so great a gift of grace that 
death, which all agree to be the contrary to life, has become the means by which men pass into 
life.‖33 This is why examples of so-called ―natural‖ evils are nothing of the sort to Augustine; 
actions or events such as tsunamis, earthquakes, and disease are not attributable to the sinful 
choice of a human agent, but stem directly from the perfect God who may use their evilness for a 
variety of good reasons, including as a means to administer the ―just deserts‖ for freely chosen 
sins. This means that either, as mentioned in the previous section, we may not know the reasons 
why God would allow such devastation (but must rest in the comfort of His perfect love and 
goodness), or we can recognize God‘s victory over even life‘s greatest enemy to bring the beauty 
of justice to His Creation – that second option, to Augustine at least, ―precisely because it 
follows from and gives expression to the divine justice, needs no theodicy.‖34 
Without question, a free will approach to theodicy, grounded in the definition of evil as a 
privation, has been one of the most historically influential elements of Augustine‘s model.35 It is 
a powerful one: many of Ivan Karamazov‘s complaints can find a response in blaming the free 
human agents who chose to create such evils. Consequently, many readers of Augustine discover 
his privation + free-will theodicy to be sufficient enough for their apologetic purposes and 
simply stop reading, thereby failing to discover the final, and most important, piece of 
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Augustine‘s theodicy – the element that allows Augustine to consistently maintain that ―God, 
who is supremely good in his creation of natures that are good, is also completely just in his 
employment of evil choices in his design, so that whereas such evil choices make a wrong use of 
good natures, God turns evil choices to good use.‖36 
Something Aesthetic: The Poetic Justice of Pankalia 
If the goal of the theodicist is simply to give God a sliver of logical possibility within 
which He might feasibly coexist with evil then the above elements of Augustine‘s framework 
will be sufficient: no one creates evil for it is a privation and evil actions are brought about by 
free, evil actors – not by God. But Augustine, like Ivan Karamazov, was not satisfied with this 
anemic description of God‘s goodness and endeavored instead to explain not merely the origin of 
evil, but why a good God would allow such evil to continue to exist after the fact. Whereas some 
thinkers have suggested that God is required to assume such a  posture for the sake of respecting 
free will, Adams quite rightly criticizes the idolatry of such a notion, sarcastically decrying the 
idea that ―personal agency [is] sacrosanct, holy ground on which not even God may tread 
uninvited without violation.‖37 Instead, Augustine ties his famous free-will defense up in a bow 
of aesthetic themes that, much like holiday wrapping paper, are often ignored for the sake of the 
prize inside. 
This ignorance is unsurprising, for the aesthetic notion in Augustine‘s theodicy is 
difficult for post-Enlightenment thinkers to affirm, committed as many are to a Humean 
fact/value dichotomy. Augustine, however, writing as he was during the period when what has 
been called ―the unity of transcendentals‖ reigned supreme, saw the true head of the Great Chain 
of Being as the unification of every property worth possessing. To say that God is the pinnacle of 
Creation, in Augustine‘s mind, is to affirm that God is, metaphysically speaking, the limit of 
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each superlative quality that subsequently applies to all other categories of existence – God is, in 
an ontologically definitive way, all goodness, all truth, and all beauty; these are ―instantiated in a 
primary and privileged way in God, and instantiated in a derivative way in God's creation.‖38 
When the Neoplatonic concept of plenitude
39
 that recognizes Creation as good in virtue of its 
fullness and variety is added to this framework – the variety made possible by the graded 
variance of existence – Augustine is then primed to make his case against Ivan Karamazov that, 
all things considered, the world is genuinely beautiful. 
As was common in Late Antiquity, Augustine demonstrated a marked appreciation for 
symmetry and the contra-position of opposites
40
 that led him to champion a definition of beauty 
as that which integratively weaves good and bad elements together into a harmonious symphony 
that is not beautiful in spite of its dark strokes, but because of them. In much the same way that 
Rembrandt‘s paintings, Bartok‘s études, or Cantonese cuisine combines dissonant elements to 
synergistically create something beautiful, Augustine‘s understanding of beauty was focused on 
contrast, but one that can only be appreciated from the proper, distanced perspective; as he says, 
―A picture may be beautiful when it has touches of black in the appropriate places; in the same 
way the whole universe is beautiful, if one could see it as a whole, even with its sinners, though 
their ugliness is disgusting when they are viewed in themselves.‖41 To myopically view a 
chiaroscuro painting from mere inches away would trivialize a given brushstroke‘s contribution 
to the overall aesthetic effect of the interplay between light and dark; in much the same way, to 
focus on the experience of a given fraction of the universe – however bad it may appear – limits 
one from appreciating the derivative beauty that suffuses all of the Beatific God‘s Creation.42 
Finite creatures such as ourselves, however, often cannot help but focus on the given 
fraction of Creation that appears most readily to us – particularly when the visceral pain of 
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ourselves or others demands our attention. This is certainly Ivan Karamazov‘s complaint: his 
inability to rationalize the immense suffering of an apparently innocent child leaves him 
hamstrung to approach any God who could allow such a thing. At this point, Augustine can be 
fairly criticized for failing to meet such existential questions; as Tallon points out, Augustine‘s 
hope of ―perfect harmony evades our vision and fails to connect with much of how we 
experience the world.‖43 However, Augustine would likely point out not only that logically 
consistent answers are not always personally satisfying, but that a single actor in Creation should 
not selfishly expect to understand all of the Grand Design.
44
 
However, Augustine‘s aesthetic theodicy does grant him more explanatory power than 
some contemporary theodicists who wish to starkly divide a ―logical‖ sphere of explanation for 
evil from an ―emotional‖ one.45 Not only does Augustine‘s answer simultaneously touch, 
however briefly, on both spheres, but it does so in a manner that allows him to easily fold in one 
final concern: the moment-by-moment aesthetic triumph of righteous judgment for sin. Given 
that sin is not merely an offense against God‘s law, but is a degrading perversion of one‘s self 
further down the Great Chain of Being,
46
 Augustine‘s understanding of justice becomes 
something more than a mere penal debt and instead offers an opportunity for Creation to 
poetically display a darker brushstroke, automatically redeeming, at least in part, even the worst 
life has to offer. With a definition of beauty as the harmony of opposites, Augustine‘s theodicy 
allows God to easily ―send rain on the just and the unjust,‖ condemning sinners to floods, 
famines, and plagues, and to still genuinely work all things for good; His ultimate, transcendental 
purpose is always meant to be something harmonious. Whether free creatures provide depraved 
elements of Creation for the Grand Artist at the top of the Chain to paint with (thereby absolving 
the Artist for the blame of those evil acts) or whether the Artist himself is structuring painful 
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experiences as moment-by-moment ―just deserts‖ for those free choices, the ultimate product is 
something beautiful. 
Consequently, Augustine‘s aesthetic themes of contrast and harmony allow him to 
recognize the frequent painfulness of the human experience alongside its happier moments in a 
manner that some Pollyannaish fideism cannot accomplish. Augustine‘s is the God who says to 
the prophet Isaiah ―I form light and create darkness / I make well-being and create calamity / I 
am the LORD who does all of these things,‖47 not denying that calamity exists, but instead 
recontextualizing such suffering to highlight God‘s ability to effect a glorious triumph out of 
even those darkest moments. Genuine pankalia (―universal beauty‖) proclaims God not simply 
as an Artist of Evil, but as its Conqueror, negating whatever destructive power it possesses by 
His subjugation of it to His will. As David Bentley Hart wrote in a response worth quoting at 
length to the deadly 2004 tsunami in India and Southeast Asia: 
To say that God elects to fashion rational creatures in his image, and so grants 
them the freedom to bind themselves and the greater physical order to another 
master – to say that he who sealed up the doors of the sea might permit them to be 
opened again by another, more reckless hand – is not to say that God‘s ultimate 
design for his creatures can be thwarted. It is to acknowledge, however, that his 
will can be resisted by a real and (by his grace) autonomous force of defiance, or 
can be hidden from us by the history of cosmic corruption, and that the final 
realization of the good he intends in all things has the form (not simply as a 
dramatic fiction, for our edification or his glory, nor simply as a paedagogical 
device on his part, but in truth) of a divine victory.
48
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This is precisely why Augustine would argue that God ―judged it better to bring good out of evil 
than to allow nothing evil to exist.‖49 And, to adapt a phrase from Marilyn Adams, to say of this 
beautiful victory that it ―trivializes‖ the worst that this world has to offer would seem, to 
Augustine, to reflect an insufficient appreciation of what ―beautiful‖ really means.50 
Something Problematic 
This is not to say, however, that Augustine reached some unassailable position with his 
theodicy that renders it immune to criticism. As already mentioned, Ivan Karamazov‘s angst 
over the phenomenology of suffering may not be existentially satisfied (even though it is 
logically answered) by Augustine‘s appeal to God‘s overall goal of pankalia. In the short space 
remaining, two other important criticisms to Augustine‘s position shall be considered: its prima 
facie inability to respond to Marilyn Adams‘ concern for horrendous evils and its apparent 
incompatibility with the Augustinian affirmation of a sinner‘s eternal conscious torment in Hell. 
Firstly, Augustine‘s perspectival shift away from a given persons‘ life experiences to the 
overall beauty of the universe as a whole does grate against Adams‘ concern for life-ruining 
experiences of individual agents (what she dubs ―horrendous evils‖); as she argues in reference 
to Augustine‘s Great Chain of Being, ―What participants in horrors are suggesting is that 
horrendous evil so caricatures Godlikeness at the top level as to defeat the positive value of the 
bottom level, indeed provides weighty reason for them to wish that their lives—prima facie so 
ruined and/or ruinous to others—had never occurred.‖51 Although some of her concerns about 
the cumulative, rather than the atomistic, effect of harms is blunted by a fuller appreciation of 
God‘s omniscience,52 her primary concern for the individual is, admittedly, not a question that 
Augustine was seeking to answer. Had Augustine been responding, like many later theodicists, to 
a particular event rather than a worldview like Manicheanism, he may well have tuned his 
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attention in the more personal direction with which Adams is concerned. Understandably, this 
suggestion does more to contextualize than excuse Augustine‘s oversight and the apparent force 
of Adams‘ point here is sufficient for her to simply lay claim to this beachhead and move on in 
her argument. And while Augustine‘s universal perspective would certainly not require God to 
―return horror for horror‖ to individuals as Adams suggests,53 her conclusion that God must 
achieve victory over evil ―or at least evils of horrendous proportions within the context of each 
individual‘s life‖ makes sense.54 
Augustinian soteriology, however, is certainly far from universalistic; Augustine spends 
many a page in a variety of works describing how ―perpetual death of the damned which is 
separation from the life of God will last forever and will be the same for all, whatever views 
people may have because of their human feelings concerning varieties of punishment or 
alleviation or interruption of suffering.‖55 Hohyun Sohn brings Augustine‘s aesthetic concerns 
into conversation with John Hick‘s classic work on the subject to conclude that ―whatever gain 
there may be in Augustine‘s aesthetic theodicy of harmony is outweighed by the idea of hell as a 
permanent feature of the universe,‖ on the grounds that an infinite amount of suffering could 
never equally counterbalance even a full and unbroken lifetime of sin.
56
 While this charge once 
again is operating on a more personal level than where Augustine was focused, it still deserves a 
response.  
Regarding the notion that an individual‘s eternal consignment to Hell could never equally 
offset his finite collection of sins, the traditional position has argued that ―the reprobate continue 
to sin in hell and thus accrue guilt that warrants further punishment.‖57 Unsatisfied with this self-
perpetuating view of hellbound sinners, Andy Saville has argued for the eventual ―reconciliation 
and the glorification of God by the damned‖ insofar as they ―come to recognize the justice, and 
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true awfulness, of their state.‖58 Although it does not quite reach the level of individual balance 
that either Sohn or Adams is seeking, Augustine would likely gravitate towards this latter view, 
perhaps allowing us to once again blunt the force of Sohn‘s criticism while still recognizing the 
point being made.
59
  
Alyosha’s Response 
For better and for worse, St. Augustine‘s theodicy has been firmly cemented for centuries 
as a wellspring for Christian theodicy. His definition of evil as the privatio boni is often assumed 
in scholarly conversations about the topic and his free-will defense of sinful evil (as well as 
God‘s justified punishment of said sins) has become standard fare both inside and outside of the 
academy. Notably, his aesthetic themes, though not given the same level of consideration, are 
equally important to a consistent reading of his project: God‘s pursuit of pankalia is the only 
thing that rationally undergirds his allowance of freely chosen evil actions. 
Ultimately, this means that Augustine‘s final answer to Ivan Karamazov looks 
remarkably similar to the response actually given by Ivan‘s brother Alyosha in the pages of The 
Brothers Karamazov: after a heated conversation with his brother culminates in a powerfully 
poetic metaphor (Dostoevsky‘s famous parable of the ―Grand Inquisitor‖), Alyosha‘s final 
argument is not a sentence, but an action: he kisses his brother in a tender display of love and 
affection. Whatever criticisms may be brought fairly against Augustine‘s system, his goal is 
undoubtedly to devotedly proclaim and intellectually defend the God to whom he prayed ―Too 
late loved I Thee, O Thou Beauty of ancient days, yet ever new! Too late I loved Thee!‖60 
So, although Ivan‘s rebellion sparked a famous debate, one need not assume the role of 
his Grand Inquisitor in the face of the world‘s evil. Instead, we might paint ourselves into the 
position of Dostoevsky‘s Prince Myshkn, whose childlike faith mirrors the young Augustine‘s 
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own journey into Christianity. And when The Idiot’s prince is said to have proclaimed that 
―Beauty would save the world,‖61 the bishop of Hippo would simply smile and nod. 
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